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  Cynthia Freeland
Abstract
In this article I examine the relationship between Arthur
Danto's philosophy of art and his practice of art criticism.
Danto has said that he included many actual examples of
discussions of art in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace
because of the feeling that, previously, philosophers had
theorized about art in a vacuum. And since the time of
publishing that book, he has written on a wide variety of both
historical and contemporary artists and art practices. Danto's
philosophy of art commits him to an account of the practice of
art criticism as interpretation. However, I question whether
the Danto-esque interpretive essay can serve as an adequate
model for art criticism. My primary claim is that art criticism
must include a more strongly evaluative element than Danto's
theory leaves room for, since on his view, the critic primarily
explains meaning by examining how it is embodied in a work.
This leaves open the question of which meanings count as
valuable or important. In his more recent work Danto has
explored a "Hegelian" view that art is primarily about art, but
this view too does not allow for art to be evaluated or
"criticized" on the basis of whether or how well it tackles the
more profound questions of meaning.
Key Words
the critic, art criticism, philosophy of art, meaning,
interpretation

Among many ways in which Arthur Danto's The Transfiguration
of the Commonplace has had a major impact on how the
philosophy of art is conducted is through its extensive range of
wonderful examples, from the fateful Brillo Box to
Rauschenberg's messy Bed and back in history to works like
Bruegel's Fall of Icarus. Danto explains, "When I undertook to
frame the beginning of a philosophy of art, I felt it urgent to
work with the most vivid examples I could find."[1] In this, he
went against the grain of what he has called the
"disillusioning" aesthetics texts of the time, which conducted
students "through a canon of writing that has, typically, so
little to do with the art he or she is gripped by as to reinforce
a thesis that philosophers philosophize in the void."[2]
Transfiguration made it much harder for philosophers of art to
think and work in a void apart from the real art world.
Danto has said that at the time he wrote The Transfiguration
of the Commonplace, he never dreamed of doing art criticism.
He could hardly have foreseen at that time his 20+-year
career in this alternative field which, he later remarked,
allowed him "to philosophize in the large way of the earlier
essayists."[3] When he undertook criticism, Danto says, he
aimed to do something beyond the "restaurant criticism"
model of mid-1950's New Yorker reviews.[4] My presentation
on this panel focuses on this "large way" of philosophizing that
was forecast by Transfiguration.
Danto's philosophy of art commits him to an account of the

practice of art criticism as interpretation. Can the Danto-esque
interpretive essay serve as a model for art criticism? Does the
art world need or want critics in Danto's sense? To begin, I will
review how Danto's philosophy of art led to his view of
criticism as interpretation. Next, I will survey some examples
from Danto's own critical writings. Finally, I will discuss the
need for an alternative account of art criticism as evaluation. It
seems Danto himself has recognized this need and moved
more in this direction in some of his recent works, particularly
The Abuse of Beauty.
1. Criticism as Interpretation
To the extent that he mentioned criticism in Transfiguration,
Danto's remarks were easy to miss. For instance, he wrote, "It
is my view that whatever appreciation may come to, it must in
some sense be a function of interpretation."[5] Just how
Transfiguration paved the way for Danto's critical career is
explained further in Beyond the Brillo Box:
The thesis which emerged from my book The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace is that works
of art are symbolic expressions, and that they
embody their meanings. The task of criticism is
to identify the meanings and explain the mode of
their embodiment. So construed, criticism is just
the discourse of reasons, participation in which
defines the art world of the Institutional Theory of
Art: to see something as art is to be ready to
interpret it in terms of what and how it
means.[6]
Danto has even claimed that philosophy of art has really only
ever been art criticism. He writes:
. . . it does seem to me that most philosophies of
art have been by and large disguised
endorsements of the kind of art the philosophers
approved of, or disguised criticisms of art the
philosopher disapproved, or at any rate theories
defined against the historically familiar art of the
philosopher's own time. In a way, the philosophy
of art has really only been art criticism.[7]
And also
But philosophy can only discriminate between
works of art and mere real things; it cannot
discriminate among works of art, all of which
must fit its theories if the theories are any
good.[8]
The argument suggested by this passage goes as follows:

1.

Philosophy of art is a theory of what counts as art.

2.

Philosophers have defined art (developed theories of
art) based on their own views of what counts as art.

3.

What philosophers count as art is the kind of art they
prefer or consider the best.

4.

The endorsement of a preferred kind of art is art
criticism.

5.

Philosophy of art is and has always been (simply and in
disguise) art criticism.

Now there is another crucial move or conclusion implied by
this argument, one that Danto does not make explicitly but
that I think he feels we are entitled to make, namely,

6.

Philosophy of art cannot be art criticism in the sense of
distinguishing good from bad art, because it involves
instead differentiating art from non-art.

How do all of these theses apply to Danto himself? He is
willing to bite the relativist bullet and allow that for him, too,
the definition of art reflects his own sense of what counts or
should count as art. But it just so happens that the paradigm
Danto works from, Andy Warhol's Brillo Boxes, is an artwork
that represents a particular culmination of art history—the
moment when it turned into philosophy. This means that in
selecting that work as his paradigm Danto can give his own
theory a unique universality or openness. The Brillo Boxes
typify and help prompt his own theory of art as the
development of an object to which a theory of art is applied.
There is a kind of reflexivity built into this definition. It can
apply equally well to works from the past that use nowoutdated theories of art (as, say, imitation or significant form)
and to contemporary art that has become a kind of meta-art
or itself a philosophy of art. We now see artists presenting as
art things that are in essence bits of philosophy, as they give
us the Bottle Rack or Brillo Box or other indiscernible
counterpart of some real thing "transfigured" by theory to
become art.
But criticism in the ordinary sense does not seem to get a
foothold here. Remember that as a philosopher of art, Danto is
advancing in his theory of art a view of the kind of art that he
prefers (just as Plato advanced the mimesis theory, Bell that
of significant form, etc.). But this is a view that functions to
discriminate between art and non-art. Yet surely, given any
particular historical philosophical definition or theory of art,
there is room for criticism. Even if the theory itself is a kind of
evaluation in the sense that it picks out art that the
philosopher "likes" as distinct from non-art which the
philosopher "doesn't like" or "doesn't count" as art, there is
room for criticism as to how well any given artwork fulfills it.
Thus on the Platonic view, greater illusionism or a more
perfect mimesis will be a plus, just as on the significant form
view, more significant form will be a plus.
However, given Danto's adoption of his own theory of art
based on the Brillo Box prototype, there does not seem to be
much room for evaluation. How can there be any kind of
gradation concerning how well a given item fulfills a theory of
art that it employs in order to "get off the ground" as art in
the first place (in distinction to an everyday object)? Is the
Brillo Box or the Campbell Soup Can better at doing this than
the Bottle Rack?[9]
2. Danto as Critic

As an art critic Danto's practice in looking for meanings in
works of art has not been confined to their statements or
theories about art itself. He has been unusual in covering a
very wide range of art, writing not only about major
contemporary figures (Koons, Mapplethorpe, Sherman,
Schnabel) but about historical figures as well (Goya, Sargent),
and also about non-western art (Chinese, African, etc.). He
has included sculpture as well as painting and photography in
his ambit, and has written on "art and culture" topics such as
the Tilted Arc controversy, the meaning of the Vietnam
Memorial, and the role of the museum in contemporary
society.
Not surprisingly, the view of criticism as the interpretation of
embodied meaning shows up in Danto's actual reviews. We do
often hear things about the artist's aims and their embodiment
in the material of the work. This can involve very subtle
observations. For example, he thinks that Sargent's ability
with the wrist is phenomenal, reminiscent of that of Velázquez
—a level of skill that has now, alas, vanished. Danto
comments about the artist's many portraits of women:
Sargent is inside and outside at once, not part of
the reality depicted but present in the depicting,
where we are aware of his astonishing brio. The
poetry comes from the desire to be inside among
the women.[10]
It is difficult to imagine a more vivid example
[than Sargnet's Sulphur Match] of artistic—or
sexual—alienation.[11]
Or again, here he is writing about the outrageously vulgar
work of Jeff Koons:
There is an order of imagery so far beyond the
pale of good or even bad taste as to be
aesthetically, and certainly artistically,
disenfranchised. Objects that belong to it are too
submerged even to be classed as kitsch. . . .
Koons has claimed this imagery as his own, has
taken over its colors, its cloying saccharinities, its
gluey sentimentalities, its blank indifference to
the existence and meaning of high art, and give it
a monumentality that makes it flagrantly visible,
a feast for appetites no one dreamed existed and
which the art world hates itself for
acknowledging.[12]
In reviewing Hockney, Danto first notes, uncontroversially,
that his works are about love, specifically homoerotic love. He
then goes on to link the works' meaning to their physical
embodiment on the canvas. Commenting on the positioning of
figures in a seris of portraits by Hockney, Danto notes that
"the tension between the differently posed figures must then
be a translation into the language of composition of something
intense in the language of feeling."[13] This analysis extends
as Danto examines the complex use of perspective in
Hockney's painting My Parents, where a mirror that should
reveal the artist himself instead shows reproductions of
paintings. This odd and surprising fact reminds us of numerous

mirrors as used in prominent predecessors' paintings (like Las
Meninas or the Arnolfini Marriage). Danto considers such
reminders relevant because of Hockney's well-known interest
in perspective in the history of art. Indeed, Danto remarks, the
artist's near-obsessive studies of this topic suggest "that he
comes close to blaming a great many social ills on
perspective."[14] It is also a striking fact that after doing this
portrait of his parents with "commanding perspectival
structure . . . Hockney abandoned such perspective almost
immediately. . . . He also, for a long time, gave up
painting."[15]
We have seen that in his art criticism Danto, true to his credo,
does offer interpretations of how meaning is embodied. What
happens, then, to Danto's own idea that art invariably involves
a theory of art? In most cases, this perspective also enters
into his reviews by way of his analysis of how artists enact a
theory of art in relation to their contemporaries, the art world,
and/or their predecessors. So, for example, he says about
Hockney that his early work was like "an anthology of the
artistic themes and strategies that defined a new
sensibility."[16] Similarly, in discussing Sargent, Danto makes
two moves that involve historical comparison and analysis.
First, he describes the painter's affinities with Velázquez, both
in the use of paint and also in showing scenes of darkness
"slashed with light." And second, he places Sargent in a matrix
of opposition between two models of genius, the happy
successful Rubens and the tortured genius Van Gogh, and
comments that Sargent was more like Rubens—a model of the
artist which, while not so prevalent any more, should not be
ignored or considered inferior.
Sometimes Danto's historical analysis goes beyond this to
examine more of the art world surrounding a particular figure.
In discussing Koons' work, Danto notes that we have more
immunity from its awfulness in the museum than in the gallery
setting "where there's nothing else but Koons it's more
threatening since it looks like he's taken over the world." Or
again, in writing about some early work by Eva Hesse, Danto
shows how wrong Hilton Kramer got it when he argued the
work was a translation of Pollock's drip paintings into
sculptural randomness. This involved disregarding things that
should have counted as elements of the work and taking them
only as supports or backdrops: "[Kramer] left out the
regularity of the drilled panels and the base, which link Hesse
not to Abstract Expressionism but to Minimalism and hence
back to Constructivism."[17]
3. The Need for Evaluation or, What Happened to Art
Criticism?
Danto's conception of criticism as reflection on embodied
meaning puts so much focus on interpretation that there does
not seem to be room left for evaluation. The issue for a critic,
as I see it, may not be simply thumbs up or down (what
Danto dismisses as "restaurant review" criticism)— but neither
should it be confined to assessing how well a work achieves its
intended aim. I once heard an art professor state proudly that
her goal was to get her students to express themselves, "even
if it is only about chocolate chip cookies." Surely the critic
must also assess whether the artist's aim is itself worthwhile

or interesting.
Now, it is true that one can find evaluative claims in Danto's
reviews. For example, he thinks that Sargent's earliest
portraits were his best work and that, "He lost the poetry
though after the fiasco of the portrait of Madam X," so that,
"Except for the portraits, in the years after 1884 the work
seems to me dry and flat." Similarly, Danto tells us that
Hockney went through a period that was "artistically thin"[18],
but that he recovered in 1977 with his My Parents—"among
the masterpieces of the century."[19] As a last example, I cite
a characteristically witty passage, this time about the painter
David Salle:
It is not so much that the work is bad as that its
badness seems willed even when there is no clear
sign that the artist could do better if he wished to
. . . Salle demonstrates a certain spectacular
perversion of artistic intelligence: anyone this
consistently awful acquires a certain reverse
grandeur, like Lucifer.[20]
To consider the alternatives to a position on criticism like
Danto's, which takes the task mainly to involve the
interpretation of embodied meaning, I want to mention the
recent charmingly small but provocative book by James Elkins,
What happened to art criticism?[21] Elkins presents a wide
array of evidence suggesting that art criticism has little use in
the world today and that almost no one really reads it. It is
not read much by ordinary folks, nor is it catalogued and used
in research by art historians. As for artists and galleries or
museums, they treat the critics who write extended catalog
essays as hired workers whose products are only acceptable if
they serve the purpose of promotion. This means critics are
regarded as waiters asked to bring in a different dish if what
comes out of the kitchen does not satisfy them.
It is not altogether clear that Elkins thinks this current state of
affairs can be changed. Nevertheless, Elkins does suggest his
own ideas about what is needed from art critics. Before
explaining those ideas, he does some botanizing and sorts art
criticism (and critics) into seven camps. These are as follows (I
use his labels): the catalog essay, the academic treatise,
cultural criticism, the conservative harangue, the philosopher's
essay, descriptive art criticism, and poetic art criticism.

1.

The catalog essay is generally descriptive in its focus
and favorable in its tone, because it is commissioned by
the gallery or museum. Elkins comments these take up
a lot of the space of art criticism, but are probably the
least read of critical essays; since they function to fill
out the coffee table book

2.

The academic treatise typically cites many scholarly,
impressive names and abstract, equally impressive
terms, but in a somewhat random order that Elkins calls
collaged or kaleidoscopic. Concepts are used apart from
standard scholarly references or sources and applied in
an idiosyncratic fashion to the work under consideration.
This is why such art critical academic writings are not
taken seriously by the 'real' academics, art historians.

3.

The cultural critic puts art into a social context and
sometimes relates it to current popular phenomena like
TV shows or social movements.

4.

Hilton Kramer is the paradigm conservative
haranguer, someone who focuses on moral qualities of
an artist's work and is always in search of "quality"
(often with a capital "Q"). (This corresponds to Danto's
own take on Kramer.)

5.

The fifth of Elkins' seven categories is the philosophical
essay, art criticism that essentially treats artworks as
bits of philosophy. Danto is listed here, not surprisingly,
along with Thomas Crow. Elkins considers Danto
inconsistent in writing historically about art, despite
having pronounced that we have reached the end of art
or of art's history. He alleges that, "Danto has not
theorized the different force of the new, allegedly nonhistorical art criticism, and it seems to me that it cannot
be theorized. . .."[22] Elkins finds Danto inconsistent to
the point of what he calls "illegibility" because of his
combination of art criticism as usual with a supposedly
a-historical and pluralist perspective. I am not
altogether sure of Elkins' point here but I suspect it is
related to my own concerns that Danto's view of art as
work that theorizes about art is not truly consistent with
a notion of criticism because it is not susceptible to
gradations of value.

6.

Descriptive art criticism is, Elkins reports, the type
that most American art critics now list as their main
goal. But such an approach cannot help identify quality
or even pinpoint which artists and works are worth
writing about in the first place. This form of writing
would never manage to get art history off the ground,
since it "begs the question of what criticism is by
making it appear that there is no question."[23] Here
again, Elkins seems to be calling for a notion of criticism
as evaluation.

7.

Elkins' final category is what he calls 'poetic' art
criticism, the sort that involves an essayist using art
as a platform for personally expressive writing. Peter
Schjeldahl and Dave Hickey are Elkins' representatives
of this form of art critical writing. Their emphasis is on
"voice, tone, and style". Although Elkins applauds good
writing, he thinks that this alone cannot supply us with
an adequate definition of art criticism.

Having surveyed these basic types of criticism, Elkins clearly is
seeking a discourse of reasons that involves some process of
evaluation. Of course, this need not amount to the model of
"restaurant review" criticism that Danto departed from in his
own work. Elkins does conclude his book very briefly with
some recommendations for reform, and he lists three qualities
that ought to be delivered in good art criticism: (1) ambitious
judgment; (2) reflection about judgment itself; and (3)
criticism important enough to count as history, and vice
versa.[24] These seem to me perfectly good criteria for the
kind of art criticism I also would like to see, evaluative and

rational art criticism.
4. Transfiguration and Transformation
Criticism in Danto's work does may in fact involve something
beyond interpretation as the search for embodied meanings. In
The Abuse of Beauty, Danto spells this out; I have in mind
in particular Chapter 6 of that book, "Three Ways to Think
about Art." The first two ways are the traditional paths of
formalist and cultural interpretation. The formalist looks at art
by focusing on design. This attitude enabled art criticism and
theory (as well as art itself) to break from the mimesis view
which had brought with it an idea of art as progressive. The
second way is to regard art as a window into a culture. Often
art historians now treat art this way, enabling us to see
vanitas paintings in Dutch art, for example, as windows into
Dutch views on morality and death.
But now, somewhat surprisingly, Danto speaks of a third
model of art writing as "poetic and subjective" and admits that
he is himself drawn to such an approach. As an illustration, he
cites a Rilke poem on a powerful ancient Greek sculpture of a
male torso. In this role, art is seen as transformative on a
personal level. Though seems rather far from Danto's
treatment of art as a form of philosophy, in elaborating on this
third idea, Danto reiterates his commitment to criticism as a
rational account of embodied meanings:
It is a model I use as an art critic all the time,
trying to say what a given work means, and how
that meaning is embodied in the material object
which carries it. What I have in mind is what the
thought is that the work expresses in non-verbal
ways. We must endeavor to grasp the thought of
the work, based on the way the work is
organized.[25]
I think there has been a form of slippage here, which arises in
trying to understand how Danto both uses and disagrees with
Hegel's idea that art, at its end, turns into philosophy. Danto
insists that this cannot be taken to mean that philosophy
supersedes art; far from it. He writes,
Philosophy is simply hopeless in dealing with the
large human issues. When I think of those Dutch
marriage portraits—or of Van Eyck's portrait of
the Arnolfini couple—against what philosophers
have said on the topic of marriage, I am almost
ashamed of my discipline."[26]
In other words, art offers explorations that have great depth
and profundity, and that often deal with what Danto calls "the
large human issues." Hence, the critic's role as the interpreter
of art's embodied meanings encompasses discussion of the
approach artworks take to such large human issues as the
nature of marriage, the purpose of life, the meaning of death,
and so on. But this seems to range far afield from the account
I initially derived from reading The Transfiguration and its
claims that every philosophy of art is just a confession of the
kind of art the philosopher prefers. That, I took it in Danto's
own case, meant that the definition of art as an object
accompanied by a theory was somewhat narrowly construed,

because the relevant theory was—it had to be—a theory of
art. This is why Brillo Box was his paradigm. It is a kind of art
that, on Danto's view, has as its main message or meaning the
point that "this too can be art." Transfiguration suggested that
the kind of meanings embodied by art objects were, generally,
meanings having to do with views on art. Certain artworks
from the past presented the fundamental message that art
was imitation, or beauty, or form and significant design, etc.
However, for art to be fundamentally about art—for art to be
in its essence a philosophy about or of art—is very different
than for art to be philosophy in the sense Danto has in mind in
The Abuse of Beauty where he has in mind discussion of the
"large issues" of life. If art can do this broader thing, then the
"embodied meanings" it is the task of the critic to distill for us
in art are meanings of all sorts on almost all topics, and not
simply meanings having to do with what counts as art. And
this entails that the role of evaluation has been greatly
expanded. Rather than showing us how various artists
manifested their theories of art in their works, the critic has
the more intriguing task of helping us grasp artists' comments
on "large issues" of life. Presumably it is fair to assess these
artists for the profundity of the issues they tackle, and not
only for their success at embodying a meaning. To revert to
my example from above, an artist who embodies his or her
views on chocolate chip cookies is likely to be dismissed as
insignificant no matter how these views are embodied—even
should they be embodied in the most excellent of cookies
themselves! (I mention this because it strikes me as a quite
likely project of a performance artist.)
If artists can legitimately be evaluated based upon the
profundity of the meanings they attempt to convey or grapple
with, it could turn out that art that is about art is in fact more
trivial than art that is about "the large issues" of life and
death. This is a result Danto might not be too happy with.
Perhaps a breakthrough artist like Duchamp or Warhol could
be credited with an originality of vision in resisting the
dominant views about art in his era. But does this make his
resulting work, whether Fountain or Brillo Box, truly
"transformative" in the sense of the term introduced in The
Abuse of Beauty? Is an encounter with either work likely to be
personally enlightening? Does it force you to become a new
person; Can it make you better? I understand these questions
to be rhetorical and to be clearly expecting the answer "no."
For me there are no tremors of profundity in encountering
these works. But Danto, fairly obviously, did experience some
kind of transformation in seeing Brillo Boxes for the first time—
this is something that he has returned to and written of
repeatedly.
There might, of course, be a link between art that is about art
and art that offers us insight into life. This can happen if,
when the artist makes us think about art, he or she also
inspires us with a new attitude or approach to our lives. Here
it is instructive to recall one of Danto's reviews, his piece
about Cartier-Bresson. After explaining the influence of
Surrealism upon the photographer, Danto comments that in
his work, Cartier-Bresson managed to reveal the surrealism
that exists all around us in nature. That is, the artist
discovered visual juxtapositions that reveal the fundamental

surrealism of life. In doing this, Danto says, Cartier-Bresson
showed us our own "visual pedestrianism."
We feel that between our eyes and the world out
there, cataracts of habit have formed, and our
own vision is dirty, clouded, oblique. So the
surrealism is invisible . . . [His photos come to as
marvelous gifts.]. . . . [O]ne feels cleansed and
empowered by them, and enlarged.[27]
This is getting at the transformative power of art as part of an
experience that is also transformative of vision and, through
this, of our experience of life itself. All this is surprisingly
reminiscent of the pragmatist line of Dewey and Goodman, of
the experience of art as enhancing.
As my final point, it is also worthwhile to reconsider the role of
aesthetics in the philosophy of art and art criticism. In
discussing the claim that art is an object with a theory, or a
meaning embodied somehow, I have focused mainly on the
issue of the relevant theory or meaning. I should also have
paid attention to Danto's point about embodiment. When the
art critic tells us about meaning, especially if that meaning is
philosophical or involves a theory of the nature of art, this
appears to involve a pursuit of something lofty and mental.
"Meaning" transpires on a plane far above that of the good or
bad dinners that restaurant reviewers tell us about. (It's only
the rare and academic restaurant reviewer who launches into
reflections about the meanings of cuisines under examination.)
But the Danto-esque art critic will also talk about embodiment.
And in my view, it's the embodiment of the Warhol or the
Duchamp that seem so lacking in aesthetic appeal and that
make the encounter with these works less fully transformative.
But on this point Danto's own art criticism seems to have
taken on a direction of its own, maybe a bit apart from his
theory of art and its philosophy. For he has always talked
about embodiment. Recall his mentioning the unique use
Hockney makes of perspective, or Sargent and Velázquez's
inimitable wrist flicks. The meaning is in the embodiment just
as the soul is in the body, just as Danto has adduced on
numerous occasions. This factor is probably what explains why
there is still room in the Danto lexicon of art criticism for us to
use those old-fashioned terms like beauty, as well as the more
new-fangled ones that speak of art as a theory of art.
Theories of art may be striking and original but they will not be
able to be truly "transformative" until they are embodied in
something real—in something sensuous and skillful, that exists
in paint or stone, in a realm more concrete than theories ever
dreamed of.
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